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Abstract 
Indirect real estate (IRE) returns are often shown to lead direct real estate (DRE) returns.  
Apart from differences in liquidity, transaction costs, and management skills, the DRE 
market is also less complete than the IRE market – when negative shocks arrive, one can only 
short IRE (e.g. real estate stocks or REITs), but not DRE.  This study investigates if short 
sales in the IRE market convey any information to the DRE market.  Based on high-
frequency (weekly) property price data in Hong Kong from 1999 to 2011, we found that short 
sales in the IRE market led DRE returns, even after controlling for the lagged IRE returns in a 
VAR model.  This suggests that short sales contain private information on the real estate 
market that is not fully reflected in IRE returns.  The spillover effect of short sales, however, 
weakened after the 2007 global financial crisis because increased uncertainty over the 
credibility of individual firms made short sales carry more firm-specific information than 
market-wide news. 
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The previous research on short selling focused on two issues: 1) if short sellers 
possess private information and 2) if short sale constraints cause stock overvaluation.  For the 
first issue, several studies showed that short interest predicted future returns.  Senchak and 
Starks (1993) and Desai et al. (2002) found that short sales predicted negative future returns 
for NYSE and NASDAQ industrial stocks, respectively.  Asquith et al. (2005) found greater 
predictive power in smaller stocks and suggested that short sales reflect negative, non-public 
information about a firm.  Using daily NYSE order data, Boehmer et al. (2008) revealed that 
heavily-shorted stocks significantly underperformed lightly-shorted stocks, especially those 
shorted by non-program institutional traders.  These findings generally supported the notion 
that short sellers have an information advantage over other traders, while Diether et al. (2008) 
also identified a feedback relationship – not only do prices follow short sales, but short sales 
also follow prices.   
As for the second issue, a number of papers tested if restricting short sales would 
reduce market efficiency and cause firms to be overvalued (e.g., Boehmer et al., 2009; Jones 
and Lamont, 2002; Chang et al., 2007; Asquith and Meulbroek, 1996).  Boehme et al. (2006) 
found that different beliefs are a necessary condition for short sale constraints to cause 
overvaluation.  Chang et al. (2007) obtained similar findings in Hong Kong and added that 
overvaluation is more dramatic for stocks with a wider dispersion of investor opinions.  
These findings are consistent with Miller’s (1997) theoretical model on differences in beliefs, 
but are at odd with Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), who argued that prices should be 
unbiased, since markets will adjust to the truncated bad news.   
While most studies confirmed that short sales contain information on the stock being 
shorted, little is known about the spillover of such information to the underlying asset market 
where short sales are prohibited.  This is a typical setting of the real estate market, where 
underlying assets can be traded in parallel with their securities – the former in the private 
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market as direct real estate (DRE) and the latter in the public market as indirect real estate 
(IRE).  The most common type of IRE consists of shares of real estate companies and REITs 
listed on a stock market.  Apart from variations in liquidity, transaction costs, and 
management skills, a major institutional difference between the two markets is that DRE 
cannot be sold short.  Even if one knows that bad news is arriving, not much can be done in 
the DRE market.  For property owners (especially owner-occupiers), it is costly and time-
consuming to sell a property, while non-property owners can do nothing but wait.  However, 
in a parallel IRE market, it is possible for informed traders to short sell IRE without changing 
their DRE positions.  This paper seeks to examine if short sales enhance price discovery 
between the DRE and IRE markets (i.e., if short selling in the IRE market conveys 
information to the DRE market). 
There were a few short sale studies in the real estate literature, but they are concerned 
only with the relationship between shorting and returns within the IRE market, not with 
spillover to the DRE market.  Li and Yung (2004) examined if REIT short interest was driven 
by security-specific information or market-wide information and found that short interest was 
associated with future underperformance, which hinted that REIT short sellers may be 
informed.  French et al. (2012) conducted a similar study using intraday short sales data and 
found that the negative relationship held more strongly for larger short positions.  Their 
analysis further revealed a strong positive relationship between shorting and volatility.  Chen 
et al. (2011) used REITs to test Miller’s (1977) overvaluation hypothesis and found that 
consistent with an overvaluation story, heavily-shorted REITs experienced significantly 
lower abnormal returns.  In contrast, Blau et al. (2011) found that REITs’ short sales 
contained less information than those of non-REITs because REITs were more transparent 
and made informed trading more difficult.  As a result, the role of short sellers in the REIT 
market remains inconclusive. 
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The parallel trading mechanism of real estate has attracted many studies on price 
discovery between the DRE and IRE markets, but none focused on short sales except for 
Brounen et al. (2012), who explained REIT NAV premiums by way of short sales.  Most of 
the prior work (e.g., Giliberto, 1990, 1993; Myer and Webb, 1993; Newell and Chau, 1996; 
Chau et al., 2001) studied DRE and IRE returns and found that they had low 
contemporaneous correlations, but high lagged correlations.  These findings underlay the 
price discovery literature, which postulates that the IRE market is more efficient than the 
DRE market in revealing information on real estate prices.  For instance, Barkham and 
Geltner (1995) modeled the price discovery process and established the predictability of DRE 
returns in the US and the UK.  Schwann and Chau (2003), using Hong Kong data from 1986 
to 1999, found that there was less information transferred from the IRE to the DRE market 
when news was external to the real estate sector.  Geltner et al. (2003) reviewed the price 
discovery literature and summarized how the opinions of traders in the DRE and IRE markets 
combined to establish market prices.   
By examining the role of short sales in price discovery between the DRE and IRE 
markets, this article contributes to the literature in at least three ways.  First, to our 
knowledge, this is the first study to examine the spillover effect of short sales from one 
market (i.e., IRE) to another market in which short sales are restricted (i.e., DRE).  Second, it 
provides a new direction to real estate price discovery research, which has typically ignored 
the potential contribution of short sellers in the relationship between the DRE and IRE 
markets.  Third, it draws on the recent credit crisis and tests if short sales’ spillover effect has 
changed.  With increased information asymmetry between managers (insiders) and investors 
(outsiders) after the crisis, short sales may contain more firm-specific information than news 
on the real estate market, and hence, would convey less information to the DRE market.  The 
information spillover mechanism will be further explained in the next section. 
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Hypotheses 
Short selling is an obvious, though not the only, action to take if one holds a negative 
view on a stock.  For short selling to affect future stock prices, market participants have to 
believe that it is more than pure speculation.  There are different ways in which short selling 
may carry credible information.  A typical way is for short sellers to have access to private 
information that has not yet been reflected in current prices.  It could be based on insider 
information (e.g. future company announcements) or different interpretations of public 
information (e.g. market overreaction to good news about a company).  Either way, the action 
of short selling is considered informative and could move future stock prices.  This is so even 
if short sellers are consistently wrong. 
Whether or not short selling can create information spillover to another market is not 
so straightforward.  If a firm is sold short due to private information on its poor management, 
nothing on other firms could be directly inferred and spillover would not occur.  Similar logic 
applies to the IRE and DRE markets.  Short selling a real estate stock due to firm-specific 
factors does not carry any information on the DRE market and should not affect future 
property prices.  For short selling in the IRE market to affect the DRE market, private 
information has to be more general in nature and have the potential to affect the market as a 
whole.  It could come from insider information on changes in government policy and interest 
rates that affect aggregate real estate demand or supply, or from proprietary strategies to 
identify systematic mispricing opportunities in the IRE or DRE markets (e.g. through 
comparing aggregate share prices to NAV premiums).   
The problem for investors is that short sellers’ motivations are unobservable.  What 
investors could reliably observe is the amount of short sales.  To differentiate between market 
and firm-specific information, one strategy DRE investors may employ is to examine the 
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short selling pattern of the entire IRE market instead of individual real estate stocks.  If only 
one or two stocks are heavily shorted, it is more likely that short sellers’ private information 
is firm-specific and would not spill over to the DRE market.  On the other hand, if short 
selling in the IRE market becomes more active, investors may infer that short sellers’ private 
information is market-wide and DRE market prices will adjust accordingly.  Since the DRE 
market is not as liquid as the stock market and disallows short sales, its price adjustments are 
expected to take longer.  This leads to our first information spillover hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Short sales in the IRE market lead price movements in the DRE market. 
 
Another way to test information spillover is to draw on the change in the information 
environment brought about by the 2007-08 credit crisis.  While the credit crisis might have 
originated from the US real estate bubble (Shiller, 2008), its consequences were profound and 
subsequently affected (and continue to affect) the global financial markets.  After the collapse 
of some major financial institutions, an important consequence is increased uncertainty over 
the credibility of individual firms.  For instance, Longstaff (2010) found that ABX indices 
had much stronger predictive power on bond and stock returns after the crisis.  Real estate 
firms (except REITs) could be highly-leveraged and could invest in financial products, so 
they are also not immune to changes in the information environment. 
If the crisis has made information more asymmetric between managers (insiders) and 
investors (outsiders), it is reasonable to expect more opportunities to trade private 
information on a firm.  This means the information revealed by short sellers is more likely to 
be firm-specific than market-wide, thereby weakening the spillover effect on the DRE market.  
This leads to our second hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2: The relationship between short sales in the IRE market and prices in 
the DRE market weakened after the credit crisis. 
 
Data and Methodology 
Hong Kong’s real estate market is chosen to test the hypotheses for two reasons.  First, 
thanks to the homogeneous and liquid DRE market in Hong Kong, weekly data are available 
to capture quality-adjusted price changes.  This is critical for studying the price discovery 
role of short sales because short sellers’ information advantage, if it exists, could be short-
lived.
1
  Second, the IRE market in Hong Kong is dominated by listed real estate companies, 
not REITs.  This reduces Blau et al.’s (2011) concern that REITs, which are more transparent, 
are less vulnerable to informed trading.  An informed trading of real estate stocks remains 
plausible. 
Our data runs weekly from January 1, 1999 through August 31, 2011.  The IRE 
market in Hong Kong consists of real estate stocks covered by the Hang Seng Property Sub-
Index, which is the most widely used benchmark of IRE performance (see Fig.1).  Short 
selling transactions were obtained from the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK).  Daily 
prices, total transaction amounts, and short sales amount data for each company are included 
in the dataset.  To measure short selling activities, some prior studies used shorting flow data 
(e.g., Christophe et al., 2004; Boehmer et al., 2008; Diether et al., 2008), while more recent 
works used short interest (e.g., Asquith et al., 2005; Boehmer et al., 2010; Blau, 2012).  We 
follow the more recent works and adopt the short interest ratio as a proxy of short sale 
intensity: the total value of shares shorted divided by the total value of shares traded (see 
                                                          
1
 In Hong Kong, only covered short selling is allowed.  Holding short positions for a longer period may incur a 
higher borrowing cost. 
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Fig.2).  There were noticeably more short sales after 2007, which suggest that the credit crisis 
might have led to more opportunities for informed trading or a higher demand for hedging 
(Securities and Futures Commission, 2008).   
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
For the DRE market, the Centa-City Leading (CCL) Index is used to capture its 
performance (see Fig.3).  It is a transaction-based hedonic price index that aims to measure 
weekly price movements in the private residential market.  Its sample came from the 
transactions recorded by Centaline Property Agency Limited – one of the largest property 
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agents in Hong Kong.  The CCL index shares a similar trend with other established indices, 
notably those constructed by the government and the University of Hong Kong (Chau et al., 
2005). 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
From the data described above, three key variables used for analysis are defined: 1) 
SIRE refers to the short interest ratio of real estate stocks; 2) RDRE refers to the weekly returns 
on the DRE market; 3) RIRE refers to the weekly returns on the IRE market.  Their descriptive 
statistics will be provided in the next section. 
Prior to testing for possible relationships between these variables, it is necessary to 
ensure that they meet the stationarity conditions (Engle and Granger, 1987).  The Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) procedure is applied to test if the variables contain any unit root.  
Denoting the time series variables under investigation (SIRE, RDRE, and RIRE) as   , the ADF 
test takes on the following form, with μ and ϕ the coefficients to be estimated:   
 
            ∑     
 
   
                                       ( ) 
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The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected (i.e., the variable is stationary) if the t-statistic of 
ϕ is less than the critical value.  If not, the variable would be non-stationary and first-
differencing or co-integration might be needed.   
After stationarity is established, the next step is to investigate if the short sales on real 
estate stocks contain useful information that could help predict DRE and IRE returns.  
Granger causality tests are used to test if each pair of the three variables has any lead-lag 
relationship: 
 
   ∑      
 
   
 ∑      
 
   
     
   ∑      
 
   
 ∑      
 
   
                                        ( ) 
 
where Yt and Xt are each pair of SIRE, RDRE, and RIRE; Yt-i and Xt-i are the lagged term of Yt 
and Xt respectively; and  1t and  2t are the error terms.  If    ≠ 0 and   =0, X Granger-causes 
Y and Y does not Granger-cause X.  If    = 0 and   ≠0, Y Granger-causes X and X does not 
Granger-causes Y.  If    ≠ 0 and   ≠0, then X and Y are said to Granger-cause each other.  If 
   = 0 and   =0, then X and Y have no Granger causality.  F-statistics are employed to test 
the significance of these coefficients.  According to Hypothesis 1, if short sales contain useful 
price information for the DRE market, SIRE should Granger-cause RDRE.  From previous price 
discovery studies, RIRE should Granger-cause RDRE too. 
Since Granger causality is only performed on a pairwise basis, we also use a vector 
autoregression (VAR) framework to examine the three variables together.  The advantage of 
this approach is that all three variables are endogenous to the system and both short sales and 
IRE returns are allowed to affect DRE returns at the same time.  This is a stronger test of 
Hypothesis 1 because short sales can predict DRE returns only if they carry more information 
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than IRE returns.  If short sales carry the same information as IRE returns, the predictive 
power of short sales should become less significant.  The VAR model is expressed as: 
 
     ∑  
 
   
                                  ( ) 
 
Specifically,    is a 3x1 vector of the three variables in the system (SIRE, RDRE, and RIRE); A is 
a 3x1 vector of constants;    is a 3xp matrix of coefficients on the lagged variables, with p 
being the lag order.  Wald tests will be used to test the joint significance of each set of lagged 
variables.  Hypothesis 1 holds if short selling activities are able to forecast DRE returns.   
To test the crisis effect in Hypothesis 2, the VAR model in Equation (3) is estimated 
separately with samples before and after the crisis.  As discussed before, the crisis is expected 
to change the information environment and make short selling reveal more firm-specific 
information than market-wide news.  Therefore, the relationship between short selling and 
DRE returns should be weakened after the crisis. 
 
 
Empirical Results 
Summary statistics  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the three variables (SIRE, RDRE, 
and RIRE) during 1999-2011.  The average weekly returns to the Hang Seng Property Sub-
index (the IRE market) and CCL index (the DRE market) were positive during the sample 
period, with the former (0.11%) outperforming the latter (0.09%).  The difference amounted 
to about 100 basis points p.a.  At the same time, the IRE returns had higher volatility than the 
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DRE returns: the standard deviation of IRE returns was 4.82%, whereas that for the DRE 
returns was 1.13%.  Thus, higher returns came with higher volatility in the real estate markets 
concerned.  The last column of Table 1 shows the short interest ratio of real estate stocks.  
The ratio shows a considerable amount of variation from 0.82% to 25.36%, with the average 
being 9.5%.  This is comparable to the average short interest ratio of 9.7% for the mainboard 
of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, but is lower than that of some other markets (e.g. 12.9% 
for NYSE-listed common stocks, according to Boehmer et al., 2008).   
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further down Panel A of Table 1 shows the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
statistics.  They indicate that all three variables during the full sample period, as well as the 
two sub-periods (in Panel B), have achieved stationarity at the 1% level.  This means the 
variables are I(0) and can be directly used for time series analysis.    
Panel A of Table 2 shows how the three variables were contemporaneously correlated.  
Consistent with the price discovery literature, the correlation between IRE and DRE returns 
was very low (only 0.03) and statistically insignificant.  The correlation between short 
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interest ratios and IRE returns was also weak (-0.01).  In contrast, there was a significant 
correlation (0.08) between short interest ratios and DRE returns.  This provides initial 
evidence that short sales may play an important role in the price discovery process between 
the IRE and DRE markets. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
Panel B of Tables 1 and 2 splits the sample period into two and presents the 
descriptive statistics before and after the credit crisis (i.e. 1999-2006 and 2007-2011).  It is 
noted that the average return of the DRE market grew sharply from -0.01% to 0.26%, 
whereas the IRE market had similar average returns in both sub-periods but higher volatility 
after the crisis.  This could be explained by the nature of the crisis, which generated much 
uncertainty about the credibility of individual firms (including real estate companies in the 
IRE market) but not the brick and mortar in the DRE market.  There was also a corresponding 
increase in short selling activities from 9.24% before the crisis to 13.01% after the crisis, 
suggesting that the crisis might have created more opportunities for informed trading or 
higher demand for hedging.  In terms of correlations, the sub-period results are similar to the 
full-period ones – the only significant correlation detected is between short interest ratios and 
DRE returns. 
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Granger causality results 
Given the weak contemporaneous correlations between the three variables, pairwise 
Granger causality tests are used to identify any lead-lag relationships between them.  The 
results are shown in Table 3.  First, as expected from the price discovery literature, we find 
that the IRE market led the DRE market, but not vice versa.  Second, the short sales of real 
estate stocks led the DRE market, but not vice versa, thereby supporting the information 
spillover argument in Hypothesis 1.  The third result is interesting: IRE returns led short sales 
of real estate stocks, but not vice versa.  While this is not the focus of this paper, it seems to 
suggest that short sellers are trend followers rather than insiders.   
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
Full-period VAR results 
Table 4 presents the full-period results of our VAR model, which estimates the 
dynamic relationships between the three variables simultaneously.  Based on the Schwarz 
criteria, an optimal lag order of two weeks is chosen.  Several significant coefficients are 
found.  First, the DRE market was driven by variables, including short interest ratios, IRE 
returns, and its own past returns, that lagged by two weeks.  This reflects that the DRE 
market is rather sluggish and takes two weeks to capitalize on any new information revealed 
by the shorting and prices of the IRE.  On the other hand, the IRE market was driven only by 
its own one-week lagged returns, which suggest that the IRE market is relatively efficient and 
not affected by past short selling activities.  The negative coefficient indicates the presence of 
a mean reversion in IRE returns.  This could imply opportunities for short sellers to trade on 
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overreactions and is consistent with the finding (in the last column) that IRE returns lead 
short sales by one week.  Short sales are also found to be strongly autocorrelated with their 
own past values. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Table 5 shows the results of the Wald tests for the joint significance of each set of 
lagged variables in the VAR model.  Basically, they confirm the dynamic relationships 
discussed before.  The DRE returns were significantly led by the past IRE returns and short 
sales of real estate stocks.  The IRE returns could neither be forecasted by the past DRE 
returns nor past short selling activities.  The short sales were significantly led by the past IRE 
returns but not the DRE returns.  Therefore, our full-sample (1999-2011) analysis confirms 
Hypothesis 1 and concludes that price discovery does not occur only through IRE returns.  
The short selling of real estate stocks conveys additional information to the DRE market. 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 
----------------------------------------- 
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Sub-period VAR results 
In this section, the full sample is split into two periods: before and after the credit 
crisis (i.e., 1999-2006 and 2007-2011).  Tables 6 and 7 produce the sub-period VAR results 
and Wald statistics, respectively.  The most important finding is that short selling had a 
different effect on the DRE market during the two periods.  Before the crisis, short selling 
significantly led DRE returns; after the crisis, such a relationship was no longer significant.  
This confirms Hypothesis 2, which predicts a weakened relationship between short selling 
and IRE returns after the crisis.  The increased uncertainty over the credibility of individual 
firms has made short selling carry more firm-specific information than market-wide news, 
thus limiting information spillover to the DRE market.  Nevertheless, IRE returns still led 
DRE returns during both periods, implying that the traditional price discovery channel was 
unaffected by the crisis. 
Within the IRE market, an interesting change in the interactions between short selling 
and IRE returns is observed.  Before the crisis, there was a significant feedback relationship 
between short selling and IRE returns – not only did IRE returns affect short sales, but short 
sales also affected IRE returns.  This means short selling could have been used as a strategy 
to correct mispricing in the IRE market.  For example, after a sharp rise in share prices, 
investors who think the market has overreacted may take a short position in order to profit 
from subsequent price adjustments.  However, after the crisis, IRE returns are found to follow 
short selling, but not vice versa.  This is more consistent with an insider information story, in 
which insiders “release” bad news though short selling and cause subsequent price drops.  
Whatever strategies short sellers were using, the sub-period results suggest a changing 
relationship between short selling and IRE returns, which may warrant further research. 
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----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 
----------------------------------------- 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
Conclusion 
Combining a unique dataset of weekly returns of direct real estate with the returns and 
short sales of real estate stocks, we re-visited the price discovery channel between direct and 
indirect real estate markets.  The evidence presented in this paper suggests that short sales in 
the indirect market convey price information to the direct market.  Such information is 
different from that revealed by stock prices, as information spillover exists even after 
accounting for indirect real estate returns in our VAR model.  Therefore, short sellers in the 
indirect market provide direct real estate investors with an additional channel for price 
discovery, which enhances the efficiency of the non-shortable direct market. 
Our findings also shed light on the short selling literature by clarifying the type of 
private information needed for cross-market spillover to occur.  We argued that the 
information has to be related to the entire real estate market rather than to individual firms.  
To verify our argument, we assumed the 2007-08 credit crisis caused major change in the 
information environment, in which the credibility of individual firms became much more 
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uncertain.  Our results showed that the spillover effect of short selling weakened substantially 
after the crisis, which confirms that firm-specific information is not relevant to the direct 
market.  In other words, the credit crisis did not only adversely affect the stock and bond 
markets, but it also indirectly reduced the efficiency of the direct real estate market. 
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Figure 1 Hang Seng Property Sub-index 
 
Source: Datastream 
 
 
Figure 2 Short interest ratios for real estate stocks 
 
Source: Calculated from SEHK’s short sales data 
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Figure 3 Centa-City Leading Index 
 
Source: Centaline Property Agency 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable RDRE RIRE SIRE
Panel A
 Mean (%) 0.09 0.11 9.50
 Maximum (%) 4.05 22.97 25.36
 Minimum (%) -4.26 -22.03 0.82
 Std. Dev. (%) 1.13 4.82 4.59
ADF (levels) -7.52 *** -28.18 *** -5.77 ***
 Observations 656 656 656
Panel B RDRE RIRE SIRE
Pre-Crisis
 Mean (%) -0.01 0.12 9.24
 Maximum (%) 4.05 15.34 28.23
 Minimum (%) -3.95 -16.46 1.81
 Std. Dev. (%) 1.18 4.29 4.19
ADF (levels) -9.32 *** -20.87 *** -7.16 ***
 Observations 416 416 416
Post-Crisis
 Mean (%) 0.26 0.11 13.01
 Maximum (%) 2.69 22.97 24.85
 Minimum (%) -4.26 -22.03 6.07
 Std. Dev. (%) 1.00 5.63 3.38
ADF (levels) -5.07 *** -18.30 *** -5.52 ***
 Observations 240 240 240
Note: All rates are weekly. *** represents the 1% level of significance.
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Table 2. Correlations
Panel A RDRE RIRE SIRE
RDRE 1.00
RIRE 0.03 1.00
SIRE 0.08 ** -0.01 1.00
Panel B RDRE RIRE SIRE
Pre-Crisis
RDRE 1.00
RIRE 0.07 1.00
SIRE 0.09 * 0.06 1.00
Post-Crisis
RDRE 1.00
RIRE -0.03 1.00
SIRE -0.13 ** -0.08 1.00
Note: ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance.
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F-Statistic p-value
RIRE → RDRE 11.092 0.00 ***
RDRE → RIRE 0.588 0.56
SIRE → RDRE 3.595 0.03 **
RDRE → SIRE 0.334 0.72
SIRE → RIRE 0.026 0.97
RIRE → SIRE 3.704 0.03 **
Table 3: Summary of Granger Causality Tests
Note:  X → Y means the null hypothesis that X does not Granger causes Y
             ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance.
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RDRE RIRE SIRE
RIRE (-1) 0.008831 -0.094637 ** 0.063233 ***
[ 0.99644] [-2.40595] [ 2.66964]
RIRE (-2) 0.042354 *** 0.012941 0.01221
[ 4.77112] [ 0.32845] [ 0.51462]
SIRE (-1) -0.007352 -0.016109 0.467817 ***
[-0.53715] [-0.26515] [ 12.7876]
SIRE (-2) 0.031322 ** 0.005531 0.361824 ***
[ 2.29229] [ 0.09119] [ 9.90744]
RDRE (-1) 0.028711 0.168503 0.067766
[ 0.75966] [ 1.00449] [ 0.67086]
RDRE (-2) 0.180504 *** 0.067856 0.012091
[ 4.78032] [ 0.40488] [ 0.11980]
 Adj. R-squared 0.075503 0.00175 0.602424
Table 4. VAR Estimation results
Note: The value in each cell is the coefficient estimate for each parameter
            t-statistics in [  ]. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance.
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Dependent Variable: RDRE,t Chi-square p-value
Coefficients of RIRE,t-1 & RIRE,t-2 jointly = 0 23.043 0.000 ***
Coefficients of SIRE,t-1 & SIRE,t-2 jointly = 0 8.074 0.018 **
Dependent Variable: RIRE,t
Coefficients of RDRE,t-1 & RDRE,t-2 jointly = 0 1.213 0.545
Coefficients of SIRE,t-1 & SIRE,t-2 jointly = 0 0.093 0.954
Dependent Variable: SIRE,t
Coefficients of RDRE,t-1 & RDRE,t-2 jointly = 0 0.473 0.789
Coefficients of RIRE,t-1 & RIRE,t-2 jointly = 0 7.191 0.028 **
Table 5: Wald Tests
Note: ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance.
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Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
RDRE RIRE SIRE RDRE RIRE SIRE
RIRE (-1) 0.002668 -0.017447 0.079997 0.010403 -0.175986 0.045188
[ 0.20085] [-0.35330] [ 2.63082] *** [ 0.95041] [-2.70244] *** [ 1.22502]
RIRE (-2) 0.053691 0.015829 0.026877 0.030902 -0.000417 0.004795
[ 4.02723] *** [ 0.31939] [ 0.88073] [ 2.82508] *** [-0.00641] [ 0.13007]
SIRE (-1) 0.002276 0.166029 0.385221 -0.023847 -0.238407 0.388935
[ 0.10948] [ 2.14809] ** [ 8.09400] *** [-1.27514] [-2.14265] ** [ 6.17103] ***
SIRE (-2) 0.039010 -0.148264 0.280705 0.020169 0.199366 0.285638
[ 1.89508] * [-1.93758] * [ 5.95743] *** [ 1.07463] [ 1.78541] * [ 4.51595] ***
RDRE (-1) -0.020677 0.030901 0.055291 0.097086 0.329316 -0.029536
[-0.42948] [ 0.17266] [ 0.50173] [ 1.58685] [ 0.90470] [-0.14325]
RDRE (-2) 0.095402 -0.054970 -0.004028 0.331940 0.368093 -0.083113
[ 1.98317] ** [-0.30740] [-0.03658] [ 5.43562] *** [ 1.01311] [-0.40384]
 Adj. R-squared 0.053804 0.000039 0.363894 0.144709 0.035380 0.338531
Table 6. VAR Estimation results (Pre- / Post- Crisis)
Note: The value in each cell is the coefficient estimate for each parameter
            t-statistics in [  ]. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance.
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Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
Dependent Variable: RDRE,t Chi-square p-value Chi-square p-value
Coefficients of RIRE,t-1 & RIRE,t-2 jointly = 0 16.225 0.00 *** 8.201 0.02 **
Coefficients of SIRE,t-1 & SIRE,t-2 jointly = 0 5.395 0.07 * 1.845 0.40
Dependent Variable: RIRE,t
Coefficients of RDRE,t-1 & RDRE,t-2 jointly = 0 0.126 0.94 2.177 0.34
Coefficients of SIRE,t-1 & SIRE,t-2 jointly = 0 5.471 0.06 * 5.172 0.08 *
Dependent Variable: SIRE,t
Coefficients of RDRE,t-1 & RDRE,t-2 jointly = 0 0.254 0.88 0.206 0.90
Coefficients of RIRE,t-1 & RIRE,t-2 jointly = 0 7.567 0.02 ** 1.508 0.47
Table 7: Wald Tests (Pre-/Post- Crisis)
Note: ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance.
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